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Abstract
This papers uses Trumpism to illustrate populism in power. It analyses it in 
its rhetorical style; in its propaganda, tropes, and ideology; and finally in its aims 
and achievements. It shows how the representative construction of the people 
is rhetorical and is independent of social classes and traditional ideologies. The 
paper argues that populist democracy is the name of a new form of representative 
government that is based on two phenomena: a direct relation between the leader 
and those in society whom the leader defines as the «right» or «good» people; and 
the superlative authority of the audience. Its immediate targets are the «obstacles» 
to the development of those phenomena: intermediary opinion-making bodies, 
such as parties; established media; and institutionalized systems for monitoring 
and controlling political power. Populist leaders compete with other political actors 
with regard to the representation of the people and use electoral victory in order to 
prove that «the people» they represent is the «right» people and deserves to rule 
for its own good. The result of these positive and negative actions delineates the 
physiognomy of populism in power as a «majority» that is tainted by an undisguised 
—indeed, an enthusiastic— politics of radical partiality: the institutions are used in 
the interested of the «winning» part against the other.
Keywords: Audience. Representation as Embodiment. Elections as Acclama-
tion. majority Rule. Trumpism.
From Washington to Caracas and from Budapest to Rome, any understand-
ing of politics needs to take into account a phenomenon —populism in pow-
er— that just some years ago was often relegated to the study of the margins of 
the West 1. This situation has changed, especially since the election of donald j. 
Trump in the United States. Since then, populism has become the catchword for 
describing what many scholars see as a set of troubling global political trends 
within democratic societies. populism is used along and at times identified with 
other recurring words: fascism, authoritarianism, ethno-nationalism, nativism, 
and finally «Trumpism». populism is an ambiguous term mostly used as a nom 
de battaille either to brand and stigmatize political movements and leaders or as 
a rallying cry for those who aspire to reclaim the liberal-democratic model from 
the hands of elites, believing that model is the only valid form of democracy we 
have 2. The intensity and pervasiveness of populism’s manifestations in contem-
* Columbia University, New york, nu15@columbia.edu.
1 This paper profits from an article I wrote with Federico Fincheltein (2018) and the Introduction 
of my book (2019).
2 d’Eramo, 2013; müller, 2016; mounk, 2018; Levitsky and ziblatt, 2018.
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porary societies make scholars talk of populism as a «crisis of democracy» 3. In 
this article, I will not use the language of crisis and will not flirt with apocalyptic 
visions. There is nothing «undemocratic» about electing a xenophobic leader; 
nor is there anything «undemocratic» about the rise of antiestablishment par-
ties 4. I take representative democracy to be a dynamic form of politics and gov-
ernment that is capable of producing and metabolizing transformations, and 
populism among them —in Norberto Bobbio’s words, «for a democratic system, 
the process of “becoming”, of transformation, is its natural state»— 5. Thus de-
mocracy is not in crisis because, or when, it gives us a majority we do not like or 
that is despicable. democracy is a risky game that can produce plebiscitary lead-
ers impatient with institutional checks and political oppositions. In effect, the 
main target of populism in power is constitutional democracy, and until populist 
majorities do not make changes in the constitution that give them a superlative 
power, curb the rule of law to their needs and put in jeopardy the separation 
of powers, their governments are still democratic. Trumpism is exemplary of 
this ambiguity and risky situation as a case of populist democracy not fascism, 
although its language is aggressive against independent media, humiliates politi-
cal oppositions and makes the tenor of public discourse factional and intoler-
ant. This paper argues that populism has family resemblance with fascism but is 
not fascism; the main difference between these two regimes pertains to physical 
violence in political competition and the practice of elections: fascism used vio-
lence as an ordinary method to win and retain power and abolished elections. 
Unlike fascism, populism practices demagoguery yet not physical violence and 
uses (at times abundantly) elections as a method for testing people’s consent and 
parading its legitimacy. While fascism does not risk being sent to the opposi-
tion, populism takes this risk. If we consider the two corrupt forms of power 
that qualify fascism —demagogy and tyranny— we see that populism involves 
the former, but not the latter. populism remains a democratic form as long as its 
latent fascism remains unfulfilled, a shadow. With Benjamin Arditi I think that 
populism is parasitical on democracy and that when in power looks like a pe-
riphery of constitutional democracy not yet another regime outside democracy 6. 
I take populism’s history to be part of the history of representative democracy 
and democratization. First born in the second half of the nineteen century as 
opposition movements denouncing elites and minimalist democracy and propos-
ing their own followers as the original, true members of the people, populisms 
became more complete as mixed regimes after the demise of Fascism 7.
1. A long and a short story
There are certainly conditions that facilitate the growth of populism: these 
conditions are unquestionably social and economic but also political and cul-
3 Foa and mounk, 2016.
4 przeworski, 2018: 2-3.
5 Bobbio, 1987: 17.
6 Arditi, 2008.
7 I share here manin’s conception of representative government as mix regime (manin, 1997).
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tural. One could claim that their success is tantamount to an admission that 
constitutional democracies based on parties have failed to resist two social dis-
figurements: the growth of social and economic inequality, so that for a large 
part of the population there is scant or no chance to aspire to a dignified 
social and political life; and the growth of a rampant and rapacious global oli-
garchy that makes sovereignty a phantom. These two factors are intertwined; 
they are a violation of the promise of political and civil equality, and they 
render constitutional democracy in urgent need of critical self-reflection on 
«its failure to put an end to oligarchic power» 8. The dualism between the 
few and the many and the antiestablishment ideology that fattens populism 
comes from these unfulfilled promises and translates into an accusation of 
party democracy 9. As we shall see in analyzing the main tropes of Trump’s 
propaganda, populist leaders purport to be sincere people’s knights against 
the soi-disant liberals; they challenge traditional parties and party democracy 
more generally.
party democracy makes «organization» a vehicle for people’s participation 
in the life of the party, which is not only made up of militants showing muscles 
against militants of other parties, but also of militants exercising some control 
over their leaders while participating in party life 10. populist democracy comes 
at the end of a process of erosion of party organization to resist which parties 
have adopted the primaries to «democratize» themselves and relaxed orga-
nization 11. parties have on the one hand become catch-all parties and on the 
other turned to the people directly in order to recover legitimacy —in a word, 
they have established a direct communication of the masses with the leader 
and thus paved the way to populism—. populist movements complete this 
trend with a radical jump: having the leader perform representation directly 
and thus bypass party organization as much as possible. As Rosenbluth and 
Shapiro write, the trajectory of Trumpism can be made start with the institu-
tionalization of the «open primaries» to elect parties’ candidates, a move that 
have dissolved the party spirit and, moreover, transformed the political arena 
in a fight between polarized brands which communication experts concoct 
in the view of attracting more «clients» or voters 12. polarization in the elec-
torate is not necessarily the same thing as partisanship (that presumes party 
identification), which is the backbone of party democracy 13. Following recent 
studies on the transformation of mass parties, we may say that party democracy 
and populist democracy are the expressions of the complex dynamic internal 
to representative government, somehow a reiteration of the «standard story 
[that] popular democracy is fundamentally as odds with party-based represen-
tative democracy» 14.
8 Bobbio, 1987: 30.
9 Urbinati, 2018.
10 I defined «organized parties» the way duverger (1958) and Sartori (1976) have suggested in 
their classical works.
11 Rosenbluth and Shapiro, 2018: 20.
12 Ibidem.
13 White and ypi, 2016
14 Leib and Elmendorf, 2012: 70.
212 NAdIA URBINATI
Scholars of politics agree that in consolidated democracies, populism 
seems to follow a cycle of electoral abstention and apathy, which is a side ef-
fect of catch-all parties and mainstreamism and the sign of citizens’ mistrust 
in party politics 15. When elected politicians and citizens become two sepa-
rate groups that make the opposition between «the many» and «the few» an 
easily grasped catchword, when ordinary citizens witness increases of social 
distress and gross violations of economic equality in the general indifference 
of their representatives and while the most powerful acquire more voice in 
politics, it may very well happen that people distrust «practical politics» and 
are ready to side with aggressive leaders promising to bring politics «back to 
people» 16.
In addition, some new factors contribute today to reinvigorating the popu-
list rhetoric, such as a globalized financial capitalism that weakens the deci-
sion-making power of sovereign states (and of democratic states in particular) 
and a globalized labor market that narrows the possibility of striking a social-
democratic compromise between capital and labor upon which constitutional 
democracy was built after World War Two. The weakening of state sovereignty 
before global corporate business meets with the people’s call for closed bor-
ders, as if democratic citizens thought that the protection of their political 
power demands the containment of free movement of peoples and of free com-
petition over salary and social benefits. Like in the past, populism associates 
the politics of social redistribution with protectionist policies; in addition, the 
dramatic phenomenon of terrorism associated with Islamic extremism propels 
a politics of state security at the expense of civil rights and stresses the na-
tionalistic character of democracy as a vital condition of cultural and religious 
identity to be protected against external enemies. The split between popular 
anti-enlightenment sentiments and economic distress and a cultural discourse 
that is dominated by cosmopolitan elites exalts a representative deficit of the 
general interest and opens a political space for populist leaders and their anti-
establishment plans.
This has made scholars consider contemporary populism a global phenom-
enon that is fostered by the global culture it censures. It comes to play two roles 
traditionally played by social-democratic parties: that of denouncing social in-
equality and the privileges of the few, who do not need national belonging to 
protect their interests; and that of reclaiming the priority of the interests of the 
majority. Resuming the two ancient categories —ethnos and demos— whose mix 
steered the construction of post-Eighteenth century democratic people, one 
might say that populism’s renaissance in several democratic countries is both 
a symptom and a triggering force that can disrupt that mix. On the one hand, 
demos («the people») tends to deflate its political meaning as the collective of 
equals in power and to translate it into a social unit identified with the majority. 
On the other hand, ethnos («the nation»), which the political nation of equals 
before the law was meant to divest of nativist meanings, tends to be identified 
15 mair, 2002 and 2013.
16 Canovan, 2002.
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with pre-political characters not acquirable by simply being subjects of the law. 
Rights exhaust their inclusive and universalist meaning to become a good that 
the nation possesses.
All these factors together, political, socio-economic and cultural add to the 
explanation of the growth of populism in democratic societies. In this article I 
presume this complex set of conditions but do not intend to study why populism 
grew, or why it continues to grow. my ambition is more limited in scope: I seek 
to understand how populism transforms (indeed, disfigures) representative de-
mocracy and pushes it to its extreme without however proposing a new regime 17. 
Trumpism can be used to illustrate populism in power.
A further premise is needed before proceeding: in order to approach populism 
analytically not polemically a distinction should be made between populism as a 
popular movement and populism as a ruling power. This distinction encompasses 
populism in its rhetorical style; in its propaganda, tropes, and ideology; and final-
ly in its aims and achievements. The representative construction of populism is 
rhetorical, and it is independent of social classes and traditional ideologies. With 
all of this in mind, the central question this paper asks through Trumpism is the 
following: What kind of democratic results does populism produce? The proposed 
answer is that today, representative democracy is both the environment in which 
populism develops and its target, or the thing it claims its ruling power against. 
populist movements and leaders compete with other political actors with regard 
to the representation of the people; and they seek electoral victory in order to 
prove that «the people» they represent is the «right» people and deserves to rule 
for its own good.
2. A Global Phenomenon
populism had a long history before Trumpism although what happened in 
the USA in 2016 had a huge impact on its meaning, particularly in the States, 
where populism has been generally identified with participation from below and 
democratization 18. Before Trump became a president, bad populism seemed 
foreign to the States and located preferably in Latin America, the fatherland of 
populism as a form of government. American scholars studying populism ex-
pressed always some sympathy with a movement that played an important role in 
the making of their democracy in the age of reconstruction after the Civil War 19. 
The people’s party (1892) prompted a desire for «moral regeneration» and for 
the «redemptive» aspirations of democracy; it encouraged «folk politics» over 
«institutionalized politics» or privileged the lived experience of local neighbor-
hoods over an abstract, distant state; and proposed itself as a means to realize 
popular sovereignty, over and above institutions and constitutional rules 20. In 
17 I defined and studied «democratic disfigurement» in Urbinati, 2014.
18 Kazin, 1995.
19 Finchelstein, 2017. A concise and excellent overview of the history of interpretations of popu-
lism can be found in de la Torre, 2018.
20 Canovan, 1999; mudde, 2001.
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this section of the paper I shall briefly summarize the main interpretative trends 
of American populism.
The term emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century, first in Russia 
(narodničestvo) and then in the United States (the people’s party). In the first 
case, it was a label for an intellectual vision that idealized an agrarian society 
of communitarian villages standing against industrialization; in the second case, 
by contrast, it was a label for a political movement vindicating the centrality of 
individual producers standing against corporate capitalism. There were other 
differences, too: in Russia, the populist voice was first of all the voice of urban 
intellectuals, who imagined an ideal community of uncontaminated peasants. 
In the United States, on the other hand, it was the voice of those citizens who 
contested the ruling elites in the name of their own constitution 21. The US case, 
therefore, not the Russian one, represents the first instance of populism as a 
democratic political movement, proposing itself as the true representative of the 
people within a party system and a government 22. That wave of democratization 
spoke of ways to include much larger sections of the population, at a time when 
the polis was really still an elected oligarchy 23.
Several other important historical cases of populist regimes emerged in Latin 
American countries. Here, populism was capable of becoming a ruling power af-
ter World War Two. It was met with mixed feelings at different historical phases, 
depending on whether it was evaluated at the beginning of its career or at its 
apex, whether it was evaluated as a regime in consolidation or a regime facing 
a succession in power, and whether it was evaluated as an opposition party mo-
bilizing against an existing government or as a government itself 24. As in Russia 
and the United States, in Latin America populism emerged in the age of socio-
economic modernization; but much like fascism in Europe’s Catholic countries, 
it led toward modernity by using state power to protect and empower popular 
and middle classes, to dwarf political dissent, and to tame the liberal ideology, 
all while implementing welfare policies and protecting traditional ethical values. 
Finally, in Western Europe, populism made its appearance with predemocratic 
regimes in the early twentieth century. Here, it coincided with colonial expan-
sionism, with the militarization of society that occurred during World War One, 
and with the growth of ethnic nationalism —which, in response to an economic 
depression, unraveled existing ideological divisions under the myth of an encom-
passing Nation— 25. In predemocratic Europe, populism’s response to the crisis 
of liberal representative government ultimately manifested in the promotion of 
fascist regimes. That said, in societies that are not yet fully democratic, the repre-
sentative ambitions of populist leaders can subvert the existing institutional or-
der (though they can hardly make the country a stable democracy) 26. This is what 
21 Walicki, 1969; Hofstadter, 1956; Taguieff, 1997; Taggard, 2000.
22 Canovan, 1981; mudde, 2004.
23 macpherson, 1953.
24 de la Torre, 2010.
25 Berlin, 1968: 138.
26 A rich and useful analysis of the «imperfect forms of either totalitarianism or democratic poli-
tics» —namely, «authoritarian regime» and whether it can prepare for transition to democracy— can 
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happened with Italian fascism in the 1920s, and with the forms of caudillismo 
and dictatorship that one sees at work in Latin American countries.
Comparing those different experiences, margaret Canovan proposed a divide 
between populism in «economically backward» societies (where populism could 
supposedly stretch to give birth to Caesaristic leaders), and populism in modern 
Western societies (where it could supposedly exist even without a leader) 27. Ac-
cording to Canovan’s framework, Western societies (she had in mind the United 
States and Great Britain) enjoyed a kind of exceptionality that makes «populism» 
almost indistinguishable from electoral cases of so-called silent majorities, who 
are courted and conquered by skillful candidates and catch-all parties 28. Trump-
ism puts an end to this interpretation. Trumpism shows that all populist leaders 
behave the same, whether they are Western or not. It also shows that populism 
as a ruling power can make progress at the center of the West or in consolidated 
democracies (after having existed in Latin American, Africa and Asia) 29.
yet the language of western exceptionalism is still very appealing. Indeed, for 
jaques Ranciere or marco d’Eramo for instance, the European extreme right 
cannot be confused with anything that happened previously, or concurrently, in 
Latin America. In their view, perón and Le pen are not much related in either 
history or theory, and certainly constitute examples that are simply at the margin 
of the world of consolidated democracies. But their view renders the European 
or Western populism as a «new» national phenomenon and moreover as too 
«exceptional» and unique to be connected or assimilated to non-Western phe-
nomena. I disagree with this view. populism, I had the chance to argue in an ar-
ticle published with Federico Finchelstein, has a history that is at different times 
global, national and supranational; this history crisscrosses the global south and 
the global north alike, presenting important theoretical and experiential distinc-
tions but also marking important zones of confluence 30. The latter are related to 
a particular authoritarian understanding of how democratic politics and govern-
ment should function. This is a disfiguration of democracy that takes away most 
of its open, pluralistic, tolerant and dialogical attributes yet not democratic in-
stitutions and procedures as such, although it tends to change them from within 
when make them in the service of a homogenous representation of the «good» 
and «authentic» people. populism is not only a style of discourse but also an 
attempt to reformulate democracy by reinterpreting its three fundamentals (the 
people, majority rule and mandate representation) in ways that are at the same 
time inclusionary for the electoral majority and exclusionary for the minority, 
paternalistic and at times even autocratic, celebrating the embodiment of the 
people into the people but not yet dictatorial.
be found in Linz, 1970. That populism leads to «Competitive authoritarianism» is the central thesis of 
Levitsky and Loxton, 2013.
27 Canovan, 2005: 87.
28 The analysis of electoral competition as ruled by catchall parties, with the primary goal of ex-
panding their electorate more than their members or affiliates, was provided many years ago by Kir-
cheimer, 1966: 177-200.
29 Ionescu and Gellner, 1969.
30 Finchelstein and Urbinati, 2018.
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From peronism to Trumpism, populism’s growth and detecting signs, al-
though contextual and thus never identical, are similar and point toward a politi-
cal transformation that changes the tenor of public opinion and, when in power, 
the functioning management of state institutions and administration. It is the 
representative maker of this change that most qualifies populism -- the percep-
tion of distress that the audience magnifies opens the door to some canny lead-
ers, ready to exploit popular criticism for gaining power quickly and once in 
power stretching the rules of the game, and the constitution if needed in order to 
make it consistent to the leader’s decisionism drive.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, populist politics is a type of poli-
tics that seeks to represent the interests and wishes of ordinary people «who feel 
that their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups» 31. There are two 
predefined players in this definition: the ordinary people and the established po-
litical elites. The thing that defines and connects these two players is the feeling 
of the former toward the latter —a feeling that a representative leader intercepts, 
exalts, and narrates—. populism involves an exclusionary conception of the peo-
ple, and the establishment is the externality thanks to which, and against which, 
it conceives itself. The dynamic of populism is one of rhetorical construction. 
It involves a speaker interpreting the claims of dissatisfied groups and unifying 
them in a narrative and above all his or her person. In this sense, the «construc-
tion of a popular subjectivity [...] reaches a point where the homogenizing func-
tion is carried out by a pure name: the name of the leader» 32. The outcome is a 
kind of movement that, if asked to explain what it is that makes it count as the 
people’s voice, it answers by naming the people’s enemies under the name of a 
leader 33. developing a direct relation to the people and the audience is essential 
for this purpose. Thus, Hugo Chávez «spent more than 1,500 hours denounc-
ing capitalism on Alo presidente, his own TV show» 34; Silvio Berlusconi was for 
many years a daily presence on both his private television stations and Italian 
state television; matteo Salvini dialogues with «his Italians» through Facebook 
more than once per day, and Trump is on Twitter night and day.
pivotal to this analysis of «global populism» is the direct relationship that 
the leader establishes and maintains with the people. This is also the dynamic 
that blurs the democratic diarchy of institutions and extra-institutions. While in 
opposition, populism stresses the dualism between the many and the few, and 
expands its audience by denouncing constitutional democracy. But once popu-
lists get into power, they work incessantly to prove that their ruling leader is an 
incarnation of the voice of the people and should stand against and above all 
other representative claimants and repair the fault of constitutional democracy. 
populists assert that, because the people and the leader have effectively merged, 
and no intermediary elite sets them apart, the role of deliberation and mediation 
31 Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/view/Entry/147930?r
edirectedFrom=populism#eid (accessed February 1, 2019).
32 Laclau 2005: 40.
33 meckstroth, 2015: 179.
34 meanwhile Chávez «attacked the Internet as “a battle trench” that was bringing “a current of 
conspiracy”»; morozov, 2011: 113.
ON TRUmpISm, OR THE ENd OF AmERICAN ExCEpTIONALISm 217
can be drastically reduced, and the will of the people can exercise itself more 
robustly. Trumpism allows us to see better the transformation that populism in 
power does to constitutional and representative democracy.
In the remaining part I shall illustrate this transformation through the analy-
sis of the Inaugural Address donald Trump delivered on january 17, 2017 as 
a sample of the main characters of what in the final part I will silhouette as a 
populist democracy.
3. Me The People
populism represents a redirection of the notion of the people so as to replace 
its juridical and legal generality with a social and substantive one. In this process 
of ethnicization and/or racialization of the political demos (as it has been the case 
of many right-wing populisms) or the identification of the demos with a particu-
lar leader and his/her followers (as it has been the case also with left-wing cases 
of populism), democracy risks become the ruling power of a specific majority 
that purports itself as the whole people and rules as an «holistic party» 35 or as if it 
were the only good majority that elections reveal but do not create, and as if the 
opposition does not belong to the same people.
Within this perspective, for populists, elections are a ritual that does not col-
lect and reflect individual votes to be counted according to the method of major-
ity; they are instead a revelation or acclamation of a majority that already exists 
(the «good» or «authentic» people) and that a leader brings to surface and makes 
it victorious 36. The populist majority is not one majority among others as in repre-
sentative democracy, but the crowing of the «good» majority whose legitimacy is 
not merely numerical but primarily ethical (moral and cultural), thus autonomous 
from and superior to procedures, and in this sense not merely political. populism, 
one might say, uses elections as referenda or plebiscites, thus transfiguring them 
in their opposite. Of course, in a democracy majority manages the government 
and shapes the politics of the country according to its plans, which electors sup-
ported. As Adam przeworski reminded us times and again, votes are power, hard 
power and majority tends to rule with all strength and determination that institu-
tions and constitution allow 37. yet the populist majority installs itself in power not 
as if it were a temporary winner but as the right winner that has the mission of 
bringing the «true» country back —thus even if elections are not erased and the 
populist majority is transitory, it is the as if approach to majority rule that makes 
all the difference—. Governing as if the government were the «right» one and its 
majority and people were the «true» one it entails using the audience (and eventu-
ally also the state) to denigrate against those who are in the opposition as they are 
declared and treated as not being part of the «true» people 38. This is the climate 
35 Rosenblum, 2008: chap. 1.
36 mudde, 2004: 543.
37 pzeworski, 1999.
38 Rosenblum, 2008: 51-53.
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in which it may happen that the majority is prone to operate at the expense of the 
rights and legitimacy of many minorities.
moreover, since the majority speaks through the «mouth» and «words» of 
its acclaimed leader, the effective (and not told) risk is that democracy becomes 
the ruling power of a tiny elite which uses the mobilizing ideology of the «true» 
people in order to make a quick jump into politics and finally get into govern-
ment. populism signifies a solidification of procedures and a substantializing of 
the democratic process in the illusion that this reshaping will make the will of the 
people less of an issue of mediation among various and conflicting interests and 
more one of reassertion of an organic body incorporated under the figure of uni-
ty as represented by the leader. populism replaces political representation with 
the delegation of people’s power in the leader. Amending the somehow Roman-
tic view of populism as a «thin ideology» that opposes the «moral» and «pure» 
many to the «immoral» and «corrupt» elite 39, I propose to read populism as a 
canny and speeding up strategy of power climbing and achieving, that uses the 
democratic method and procedures after twisting them in a way that can serve 
non-democratic ends, such as humiliating minorities and oppositions through a 
mobilization of the majoritarian audience and on some occasions changes in the 
constitution, and that profits from an effective condition of stress and mistrust of 
large sectors of the population toward traditional parties. In addition, a populist 
regime cultivates an ambition to rule over a society in which only the leader’s 
party successfully pursues a hegemonic politics, while all other parties are mar-
ginalized into near nonexistence, submerged by the rampant propaganda of the 
leader in government. yet marginalizing is not the same as suppressing and in 
this sense a populist government is not as said a fascist regime. Beyond its stra-
tegic impulses, populism, potentially becomes an authoritarian understanding of 
how democracy should be ruled. It is indeed an ideological construct that de-
picts the many as legitimate and moral and the few as a disease or a disturbance. 
But once elected, the leader acts unilaterally and decides without meaningful 
institutional consultation or mediation, although in permanent communication 
with the people outside to reassure they are always the master of the game while 
he’s their knight in the Capital city, as Trump implied times and again. populism 
is indeed an ideological construct representing the many as «moral» and «hon-
est» and the few as «corrupt» or «immoral», yet this is hardly the creation of the 
many that have no voice and identity without a leader speaking in their name.
The «thin ideology» of the politics of morality hides a clear strategy for power 
conquering that has intolerant ruling at its constitutive core as we can see from 
the way in which populist electoral victory is interpreted —as indeed «taking the 
people back» as if the people were not represented before the populist leader 
was elected—. The implication of this not innocent declaration of legitimacy is 
that all prior governments were morally illegitimate although formally legitimate, 
a radical disfigurement of democratic proceduralism and the democratic pro-
cess. populism is thus not an ideology that wants simply to mobilize the people 
against the establishment or that wants to mobilize the people in order to make 
39 mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013.
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them the actor of their own emancipatory needs. populism «uses» the «moral» 
people argument and asks the people to identify with a political outsider (thus 
«moral») leader, moreover to trust the latter will work for their emancipation 
—more important, it claims that the leader will do it for them, not them by 
themselves—. populism is not a species of direct democracy thus, but a form of 
«direct representation» or the making of the leader as representative by his di-
rect and permanent connection to the people. It is thus the representative agent 
that is direct in its claim rather than the people identifying with him. In Trump’s 
words:
We, the citizens of America, are now joined in a great national effort to rebuild 
our country and to restore its promise for all of our people. Together, we will 
determine the course of America and the world for years to come. We will face 
challenges. We will confront hardships. But we will get the job done 40.
This brings us to the last character of populism this paper intends to stress, 
the fact that populism is an ideology based on trust through faith more than 
trust through free and open deliberation among the followers and between them 
and the representative, and in this sense a trust that is essentially linked to its op-
posite, mistrust. populism does not cultivate nor actually appreciates the idea of 
accountability but claims that to have a beloved and populist leaders is enough 
condition for trust. And in fact, the idea of the people that populism sponsors it 
is structured in a way that is congenial to this surrender by faith in the leader’s 
hand: the victory of populism is not merely the victory of the people but that 
of the «true» people, the authentic people that a representative leader declares 
to interpret in its right wills and needs as nobody has done before, although 
ruling with the consent of a majority. In fact, at one point the actual people are 
transformed into an imaginary entity incarnated in the leader, who extracts the 
«true» people from the empirical people that inhabit a country or is subjected to 
a country’s legal order.
populism in power seems to make possible a post-fascism-coupled-with-
elections and the remaining democratic institutions, which a leader incarnating 
the people as one is primed to re-legitimize. As Chávez declared after reaching 
power, he was no longer himself but the people, «I am no longer myself. I feel as 
incarnated in the people. Chávez became the people and now we are millions» 41. 
Similarly, perón said that peronism «became incarnated forever in the Argen-
tine people» 42. As we see from his Inaugural Address, Trump repeated the same 
trope when he proposed himself as representative of «everyone» across America 
and his presidency the people’s celebration:
It belongs to everyone gathered here today and everyone watching all across 
America. This is your day. This is your celebration. And this, the United States of 
America, is your country. What truly matters is not which party controls our gov-
ernment, but whether our government is controlled by the people. january 20th 
40 Trump, 2017.
41 «Yo ya no soy yo, me siento encarnado en el pueblo. Ya Chávez se hizo pueblo, y ahora somos 
millones» (Ramonet, 2012: 1).
42 «Se ha encarnado para siempre en el pueblo argentino» (perón, 1953: 82).
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2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation 
again. The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer 43.
In criticizing the then moribund parliamentarianism and speaking to the au-
thoritarians of his times, Carl Schmitt wrote that electoral accountability is a 
liberal concept that presumes a transaction kind of relationship, thus a set of 
rules and actors apt to market kind of relations, not politics. people —the actual 
existing people of the nation— is the right sovereign and there is nobody outside 
that can question it or limiting it; hence, the public manifestation of the consent 
of the people in the form of identification with, and acclamation of «its» leader 
is the only valid accountability because the only political manifestation of the 
popular will, not procedural and formal. The intensity and acclamation power of 
the people are the prove of their strength and their leader’s legitimacy 44.
This means that the ideological discourse that opposes the «pure» people to 
the «corrupt» elite is like the top of the iceberg sustained by a view of the people 
(represented by its leader) that because it is sovereign cannot be wrong. As pauli-
na Ochoa Espejo writes, «Since they are the people, they cannot be wrong; since 
the people are sovereign, they cannot lose. Thus, when populists find themselves 
in the electoral opposition, they see that as itself a flagrant injustice that requires 
“taking back” the country from whose who have stolen it from the authentic 
people» 45. All issues of accountability vanish within this perspective. We come 
here to see that the expression «taking back» the country betrays the cross-eyed 
relationship of populism with democracy. The democratic principle of majority 
is directly linked to the idea that it is the will and opinion of the single citizen 
that counts and must be counted equally. This entails that the people over there 
is never actually already there, but is formed in its political actorship every time 
votes are counted. This is what populism transforms. So Trump:
Every four years, we gather on these steps to carry out the orderly and peace-
ful transfer of power, and we are grateful to president Obama and First Lady 
michelle Obama for their gracious aid throughout this transition. They have been 
magnificent. Today’s ceremony, however, has very special meaning. Because today 
we are not merely transferring power from one administration to another, or from 
one party to another —but we are transferring power from Washington, d. C. 
and giving it back to you, the American people—. For too long, a small group 
in our nation’s Capital has reaped the rewards of government while the people 
have borne the cost. Washington flourished —but the people did not share in its 
wealth. politicians prospered— but the jobs left, and the factories closed. The 
establishment protected itself, but not the citizens of our country. Their victories 
have not been your victories; their triumphs have not been your triumphs; and 
while they celebrated in our nation’s capital, there was little to celebrate for strug-
gling families all across our land. That all changes —starting right here, and right 
now, because this moment is your moment: it belongs to you—.
But to use the electoral procedure in order to bring to the surface that which 
exists already —as populist parties claim— it entails devaluing democratic pro-
43 Trump, 2017.
44 Schmitt, 2008: 370.
45 Ochoa, 2017: 94.
ON TRUmpISm, OR THE ENd OF AmERICAN ExCEpTIONALISm 221
cedures and more important equal political liberty, which is the assumption of 
democracy as a form of politics and government that belongs to not the masses 
but each individual citizen. It entails to assume that majority has an embodied 
might that counts more than a mere temporary quantity and exists already, as 
a sleeping «true» sovereign waiting for the right prince to be awaken. Clearly, 
majority is not a merely method for decisions but becomes a substance, a homog-
enous unit that already exists, with a specific culture, ethnical identity, religion 
or interests and is ready to keep off the impostors and traitors who occupy the 
public sphere of opinion and institutions. Thus the logic of the populists is es-
sentialist not procedural —they want to reinstall the true people in power— 46. 
Within this rendering of democracy, only the populist majority is the legitimate 
people. In many cases, as in that of Trump or Nicolás maduro, these majorities 
are more imagined than actual and in fact pure rhetorical construction, with the 
function and power to make the imagined majorities look real. They represent 
slim or inexistent political majorities, but the actual mathematics of electoral 
politics are not the only marker of sovereignty for populists any way. Still, it is 
notable that the ideological mantra of sweeping electoral victories as the form of 
ultimate legitimacy for a leader that otherwise presents more theological forms of 
sovereignty, remains an important historical distinction between populism and 
its illiberal predecessor in power, fascism 47.
To sum up, populism can be seen as an authoritarian national form of de-
mocracy, a post-fascism in which the issue of who rules or uses the procedures 
acquires much more relevance than the issue of how procedures are operated 
and used. more explicitly, in fact, the «who» is the sociological force that gives 
legitimacy to the procedural «how», which comes to be seen a pure formality to 
be subjected to its will. It is indeed a fact that in all countries in which a populist 
force gets the majority, the tension within the powers of the state emerges and the 
contestation against the non-political institutions (like justice or bureaucracy) in 
the name of the superiority of the political institutions starts. populism is impa-
tience with constitutionalism as we knew it or as a system of division of powers 
(and in some countries of checks and balances) that regulates the functioning 
of state institutions whose basic legitimacy comes from the people via elections 
(and on some occasions referendum). Reaching power through mobilization, a 
populist leadership can consolidate and perpetuate it through patronage or cli-
entelism. A democratic machiavelli would say that in that case, it would not be 
the people sovereign «over the law» but the leaders who win people’s consent to 
their plans. political scientists call this «discriminatory legalism» —the idea that 
«everything for my friends; for my enemies, the law»— 48.
This is what populism may do when it succeeds in conquering consent and 
changing the procedures of constitutional democracy. populist leaders or parties 
that have enough power are not content with simply winning a majority but want 
46 On the relationship between populism and presidential democracy —in opposition with Kelsen 
and Bobbio’s theory of parliamentary democracy— see pazé, 2017: 122.
47 Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015.
48 Weyland, 2013: 21.
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a more unbounded power and moreover to stay in power as long as possible; 
they «will seek to establish a new populist constitution —in both the sense of a 
new sociopolitical settlement and a new set of rules for the political game—» 49. 
This is what in some European countries is today happening with the emergence 
of strong populist leaders or nationalistic parties. just to offer an example, the 
Hungarian Civil Alliance (Fidesz) won a supermajority of the seats in parliament 
and since 2012 used it to scrap the old Constitution, write a new one, and amend 
it continuously, entrenching its own political vision at the expense of opposition 
parties and an independent judiciary 50. Similar forms of populist «constitution-
alism» recurrently happened in Latin America, from perón to Chávez. more 
generally, populists, from Trump to Salvini often equate legality with repressive 
notions of «law and order». This «penal populism» constantly undermines po-
litical and social forms of equality 51. This view of the law is essentially Schmit-
tian in equating legality with legitimacy. perón synthetized it when he famously 
said in 1973 one could not present «dualities» as a conductor in politics, «to 
the friend [we give] everything, toward the enemy, not even justice» 52. The first 
thing in politics was to make clear who were the «eternal enemies of the people».
Hence, populism in power is thwarted between two movements: a permanent 
electoral campaign in order to stress and reconfirm the leader’s unity with the 
people and a more radical and dangerous course of action toward constitutional 
reform that gives the direct ruling power of the elected leader of the people a 
superlative power. The misfortune of Trump is the fortune of American democ-
racy; this fortune resides in the Constitution of the United States, which is not 
only hard to be revised but moreover based on a federal system that adds to 
the institutional containment of the executive power. After winning the presi-
dential election, Trump wanted to convey an argument against the division that 
he himself had fueled in the campaign, and in doing so he actually stressed the 
need to collapse all distinctions for the sake of the whole. His people had to «get 
together»: «To all Republicans, democrats and independents across this nation, 
I say it is time for us to come together as one united people». It was clear then, 
that polarization would not leave the stage. Attacking partisanship and homog-
enizing the people are a key element of his populism. This was Trump in his most 
«inclusive» moment. However, the more «real donald Trump», and especially 
through the medium of tweeter has represented an exclusionary politics toward 
his political adversaries and minority peoples.
The redefinition of the people in such absolutist and substantialist terms 
makes populists conclude that single electoral decisions are a prove of the people 
participation and consecration of leaders, who are construed as the only legiti-
mate representative of the people. In turn, the idea of a single unified people 
led by these leaders rests on the notion of radical adversaries which are repre-
sented as «enemies of the people» (Trump) or the «anti-people» (perón). All 
49 müller, 2016: 62.
50 Arato, 2016: 205-222.
51 W. jennings, S. Farrall, E. Gray and C. Hay, 2017.
52 Finchelstein, 2014: 90-92.
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these characteristics of populism presented very distinctive histories. The result 
of a historical reading of populism is a necessary stress on variations and contex-
tual mediations. Thus, Trump is different from peronism in the same way that 
Hugo Chávez differs from Silvio Berlusconi or marine Le pen or matteo Salvini. 
populism is a complex phenomenon that cannot be easily reduced to an ideal-
type or a Cartesian clear and distinct idea or even an essence. yet these histories 
need to be told in both national and transnational terms. populism, especially in 
its right-wing xenophobic forms is in its own way an international and suprana-
tional phenomenon that speaks in the name of the nation and the people. It is a 
matter of elective affinity that Le pen adopted the slogan «Au nom du peuple» 
or that Trump presented himself in the Republican convention of 2016 as the 
«voice of the people».
Conclusion
Trumpism leads us to understand the implications of populism’s reappear-
ance in relation to constitutional democracy. Constitutional democracy is the 
political order that promises to protect basic rights (which are essential to the 
democratic process) by limiting the power of the majority in government, by 
providing stable and regular opportunities for changing majorities and govern-
ments, by guaranteeing social and procedural mechanisms that permit the larg-
est possible part of the population to participate in the game of politics, and by 
influencing decisions and changing who makes decisions. It does this through 
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. Stabilized after 
World War Two with the defeat of mass dictatorships, constitutional democracy 
was meant to neutralize the problems that populism is now trying to capital-
ize on 53. These are (1) the resistance of democratic citizens to political interme-
diation, and to organized and traditional political parties in particular; (2) the 
majority’s mistrust of the institutional checks on the power that the majority 
legitimately derives from the citizens’ vote; and (3) the climate of distress with 
pluralism, or with the views and groups that do not fit with the majoritarian 
meaning of «the people». I have argued that representation and the audience 
is the terrain on which the populist battle over these issues takes place and that 
constitutional democracy is the target.
In conclusion, populist democracy is the name of a new form of representa-
tive government that is based on two phenomena: a direct relation between the 
leader and those in society whom the leader defines as the «right» or «good» 
people; and the superlative authority of the audience. Its immediate targets are 
the «obstacles» to the development of those phenomena: intermediary opinion-
making bodies, such as parties; established media; and institutionalized systems 
for monitoring and controlling political power. The result of these positive and 
negative actions delineates the physiognomy of populism as an interpretation of 
«the people» and «the majority» that is tainted by an undisguised —indeed, an 
53 müller, 2011: 5.
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enthusiastic— politics of radical partiality: the institutions are used in the inter-
ested of the «winning» part against the other. This partiality can easily disfigure 
the rule of law (which requires that government officials and citizens are bound 
by and act consistent with the law), and also the division of powers, which —tak-
en together— include reference to basic rights, democratic process, and criteria 
of justice or right. That these elements form the core of constitutional democracy 
does not imply they are naturally identical to democracy as such. Their inter-
twinement occurred through a complex, often dramatic, and always conflictual 
historical process, which was (and is) temporal, open to transformation, and fi-
nite. It can be revised and reshaped, and populism is one form this revision and 
reshaping can take.
Bibliography
Arato, A. (2016). Post Sovereign Constitution: Learning and Legitimacy, Oxford, Oxford 
University press.
Arditi, B. (2008). Politics on the Edge of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, 
Agitation, Edinburg, Edinburg University press.
Berlin, I. (1968). To Define Populism, précis of the conference held in London in 1967, 
«Government and Opposition», 46, 137-179.
Bobbio, N. (1987). The Future of Democracy, trans. from the Italian by Roger Griffin, ed. 
Richard Bellamy, Cambridge, polity press.
Canovan, m. (1981). Populism, New york, Harcourt Brace jovanovich.
— (1999). «Trust the People!» Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy, «political Stud-
ies» 47, 2-16.
— (2002). Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy, in 
meny, y., Surel, y. (eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, cit., 25-44.
— (2005). The People, Cambridge, polity press.
de la Torre, C. (2010). Populist Seduction in Latin America, Athens, Ohio State University 
press.
— (2018). Populism Revived: Donald Trump and the Latin American Leftist Populists, 
«The Americas», 47, 734-738.
d’Eramo, m. (2013). Populism and the New Oligarchy, trans. from the Italian by G. Elli-
ott, «New Left» 82, 5-28.
duverger, m. (1958). Political Parties. Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 
(1951), tr. Brogan, T. W., London, methuen; New york, Wiley.
Finchelstein, F. (2014). The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War. Fascism, Populism and 
Dictatorship in Twentieth Century Argentina, New york, Oxford University press.
— (2017). From Fascism to Populism in History, Oakland, Univ. of California press.
Finchelstein, F., Urbinati, N. (2918). On Populism and Democracy, «populisms», 1, 1-23.
Foa, S. F., mounk, y. (2016). The Democratic Disconnect, «journal of democracy», 27, 
5-17.
Hofstadter, R. (1956). The Age of Reform, New york, Alfred A. Knopf.
jennings, W., Farrall, S., Gray, E., Hay, C. (2017). Penal Populism and the Public 
Thermostat: Crime, Public Punitiveness, and Public Policy, «Governance: An Interna-
tional journal of policy, Administration, and Institutions», 30, 463-481.
Kazin, m. (1995). The Populist Passion: An American History, New york, Basic Books.
Kircheimer, O. (1966). The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems, in La 
palombara, j. (ed.), Political Parties and Political Development, princeton, Nj, prince-
ton University press, 177-200.
ON TRUmpISm, OR THE ENd OF AmERICAN ExCEpTIONALISm 225
Laclau, E. (2005). Populism: What’s in a Name, in panizza, E. (ed.), Populism and the 
Mirror of Democracy, London, Verso, 22-49.
Leib, E. j., Elmendorf, C. S. (2012). Why Party Democrats Need Popular Democracy and 
Popular Democrats Need Parties, «California Law Review», 100.
Levitsky, S., Loxton, j. (2013). Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism: The Case of 
Fujimori’s Peru, in mudde, C., Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (eds.), Populism, cit., 160-181.
Levitsky, S., ziblatt, d. (2018). How Democracies Die, New york, Crown.
Linz, j. j. (1970). An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, in Allardt, E., Rokkan, S. (eds.), Mass 
Politics: Studies in Political Sociology, with a foreword by S. m. Lipset, New york, 
Free press.
macpherson, C. B. (1953). Democracy in Alberta: The Theory and Practice of a Quasi-
Party System, Toronto, University of Toronto press.
mair, p. (2002). Populist Democracy vs. Party Democracy, in meny, y., Surel, y. (eds.), 
Democracies and the Populist Challenge, cit.
— (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy, London-New york, 
Verso.
manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University press.
meckstroth, C. (2015). The Struggle for Democracy: Paradoxes of Progress and the Politics 
of Change, Oxford, Oxford University press.
meny, y., Surel, y. (eds.) (2002). Democracies and the Populist Challenge, New york, 
palgrave macmillan.
morozov, E. (2011). The Dark Side of Internet Freedom: The New Delusion, New york, 
publicAffairs.
mounk, y. (2018). The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to 
Save It, Cambridge, mA, Harvard University press.
mudde, C. (2001). In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms 
in Eastern Europe, «East European politics and Societies», 15, 33-53.
— (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist, «Government and Opposition», 39, 541-563.
mudde, C., Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (eds.). (2013). Populism in Europe and the Americas: 
Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, Cambridge, Cambridge University press.
müller, j.-W. (2011). Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe, 
New Haven, CT, yale University press.
— (2016). What Is Populism?, philadelphia, University of pennsylvania press.
Ochoa, p. E. (2017). Populism and The People, «Theory & Events», 20, 92-99.
pazé, V. (2017). Il populismo come antitesi della democrazia, «Teoria politica», 7, 111-125.
peron, j. (1953). Mensaje del Presidente de la Nación Argentina General Juan Perón, Bue-
nos Aires, Subsecretaría de Informaciones de la presidencia de la Nación.
przeworski, A. (2018). Why Bother with Elections?, Cambridge, polity press.
Ramonet, I. (2012). Chávez en campaña, «Le monde diplomatique en Español», 202.
Roberts, K. m. (2015). Populism, Political Mobilizations, and Crisis of Political 
Representation, in de la Torre, C. (ed.), The Promise and Perils of Populism: Global 
Perspectives, Lexington, University press of Kentucky, 140-158.
Rosenbluth, F. m., Shapiro, I. (2018). Responsible Parties: Saving Democracy from Itself, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University press.
Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2015). Explaining the Emerge of Populism in Europe and the 
Americas, in de la Torre, C. (ed.), Promise and Perils of Populism, The Promise and 
Perils of Populism: Global Perspectives, Lexington, University press of Kentucky.
Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University press.
Schmitt, C. (2008). Constitutional Theory, 1st edn 1928, trans. and ed. j. Seitzer, foreword 
by E. Kennedy, durham, duke University press.
226 NAdIA URBINATI
Taggart, p. (2000). Populism. London, Open Univ. press.
— (2002). Populism and the Pathologies of Representative Politics, in mény and Surel 
(eds.), Democracies and the Populist Challenge, cit.
Taguieff, p.-A. (1997). Populism and Political Science: From Conceptual Illusions to Real 
Problems, «Vingtième Siècle. Revue d’histoire», 56, 4-33.
Trump, d. (2017). Inaugural Address, Washington, DC, January 20, https://en.wikisource.
org/wiki/Donald_Trump%27s_Inaugural_Address.
Urbinati, N. (2014). Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth and the People, Cambridge. 
mass., Harvard University press.
— (2018). Antiestablishment and the Substitution of the Whole with One of Its Parts, in 
de la Torre, C. (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, London, Routledge, 
77-97.
— (2019). Me The People: How Populism Transforms Democracy, Cambridge, mass., 
Harvard University press.
Walicki, A. (1969). Russia, in Ionescu, G., Gellner, E. (eds.), Populism, London, macmil-
lan, 62-96.
Weyland, K. (2013). The threat from the populist left, «journal of democracy», 24, 18-32.
White, j., ypi, L. (2016). The Meaning of Partisanship, Oxford, Oxford University press.
